Perhaps the strongest argument against the existence of God is the problem of evil, popularized by John Mackie in his 1955 article “Evil and Omnipotence.”[i] The logical formulation of the problem of evil states that an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God is inconsistent with the presence of evil in the world. The evidential formulation of the problem on evil identifies the incompatibility of an all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful God with pointless worldly suffering.[ii] The logical formulation of the problem of evil is based on the following two premises and single conclusion:
Logical Formulation
P1: If an omnipotent, omnibenevolent and omniscient god exists, then evil does not.
P2: There is evil in the world.
C1: Therefore, an omnipotent, omnibenevolent, and omniscient god does not exist.
There is also an evidential formulation of the problem of evil based on the existence of unnecessary suffering in the world. This version was developed by William Rowe as an argument for atheism.[iii] The evidential formulation of the problem of evil (the Rowe version) is similarly based on two premises and single conclusion:
Evidential Formulation
P1: There exist instances of intense suffering that an omnipotent, omniscient being could have prevented without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
P2: An omniscient, wholly good being would prevent the occurrence of any intense suffering it could, unless it could not do so without thereby losing some greater good or permitting some evil equally bad or worse.
C1: Therefore, there does not exist an omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.
The problem of evil counters several arguments for the existence of God, but primarily the ontological argument. As discussed previously, the ontological argument argues for the existence of a God defined as a being than which no greater can be conceived. This infinite greatness necessarily requires God to be all-good, all-knowing, and all-powerful, which constitutes the basis for the problem of evil. This section will offer several apologetic responses to the problem of evil, but the logical dilemma remains. If God hates evil and unnecessary suffering, and has the power to eliminate both, why would He not do so? This is precisely the struggle that Job had in trying to understand his trials and sufferings. God does not explain himself, but simply chides Job for questioning God’s sovereignty.
“Who is this who darkens the divine plan by words without knowledge? Now tighten the belt on your waist like a man, And I shall ask you, and you inform Me! Where were you when I laid the foundation of the earth? Tell Me if you have understanding.” (Job 38: 2-4).
God’s point is noted, but it does not provide an apologetic answer to the problem of evil. Philosophically, this view is called compatibilism, where it is simply assumed that the presence of evil and suffering in the world is somehow compatible with a God that is all-good and all-powerful. Compatibilism is the preferred position of Reformed theologians and is summarized in the Westminster Confession as follows:
“God from all eternity, did, by the most wise and holy counsel of His own will, freely, and unchangeable ordain whatsoever comes to pass; yet so, as thereby neither is God the author of sin, nor is violence offered to the will of the creatures; nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established. Although God knows whatsoever may or can come to pass upon all supposed conditions; yet has He not decreed anything because He foresaw it as future, or as that which would come to pass upon such conditions.”[iv]
Compatiblism is preferred by Reformed theologians since they do not believe in libertarian free will (which is discussed below). They further believe that the problem of evil and the origin of evil is a mystery beyond human understanding (like non-libertarian free will). Jordan Steffaniak summarizes, “Humanity does not know the origin of evil or how it works exactly because God has chosen to conceal it for our good.”[v]
A person that is questioning the existence of God due to the problem of evil will not be comforted by telling them to trust in God’s sovereignty. As Douglas Groothuis honestly observes, “Evil in the world is a possible defeater to theism and Christian theism; it is a prima facie problem.”[vi] It is typically more effective for an apologetic approach to offer a positive argument that attempts to solve the problem of evil. Such an argument is called a theodicy. The most common theological solutions to the problem of evil are free will theodicy, soul-building theodicy, and greater good theodicy. Each of these is now discussed.
Perhaps the most common Christian explanation for the problem of evil is that people have free will in the libertarian sense. If people are free to choose good, they must also be free to choose evil. Otherwise they are not truly free. If people were created to only choose good, they become akin to God’s puppets and are not true moral agents. C.S. Lewis writes:
God created things which had free will. That means creatures which can go either wrong or right. Some people think they can imagine a creature which was free but had no possibility of going wrong; I cannot. If a thing is free to be good it is also free to be bad. And free will is what has made evil possible. Why, then, did God give them free will? Because free will, though it makes evil possible, is also the only thing that makes possible any love or goodness or joy worth having. A world of automata—of creatures that worked like machines—would hardly be worth creating. The happiness which God designs for His higher creatures is the happiness of being freely, voluntarily united to Him and to each other in an ecstasy of love and delight.[vii]
Free will theodicy understands that evil due to human choices is the responsibility of humans and not God. However, the problem of natural evil and unnecessary suffering due to non-human causes remains. As such, many prefer a soul-building theodicy to a free will theodicy. A soul-building theodicy includes the concept of evil due to free choices, but also holds that pain and suffering, including pain and suffering due to non-human causes, are necessary for moral development. C.S. Lewis also explored this aspect of the problem of evil. He writes:
“We are perplexed to see misfortune falling upon decent, inoffensive, worthy people—on capable, hardworking mothers of families or diligent, thrifty, little trades-people, on those who have worked so hard, and so honestly, for their modest stock of happiness and now seem to be entering on the enjoyment fit with the fullest right … God, who made these deserving people, may really be right when He thinks that their modest prosperity and the happiness of their children are not enough to make them blessed: that all this must fall from them in the end, and that if they have not learned to know Him they will be wretched. And therefore He troubles them, warning them in advance of an insufficiency that one day they will have to discover. The life to themselves and their families stands between them and the recognition of their need; He makes that life less sweet to them.”[viii]
Soul-building theodicy takes the position that God created this world so that people could develop morally through a certain amount of hardship. This world can therefore be thought of as the best possible world as it was specifically designed for God’s purpose and does this in the best possible way. Irenaeus was an early advocate that this world must be the best possible world. Soul-building theodicy in this form is therefore referred to as Irenaean theodicy.
There is much merit to soul-building theodicy. Erik Wielenberg writes, “I think that the soul-making theodicy is among the more promising theodicies available, and that Lewis’s version of that theodicy deserves the attention of contemporary philosophers.”[ix] However, many feel that soul-building theodicy unacceptably makes God the author of evil, at least with respect to naturally-caused pain and suffering. Attempts to avoid this are typically called greater good theodicies.
A greater good theodicy assumes that a certain amount of evil and suffering are necessary so that certain goods can be realized that would not otherwise be possible. Free will can be framed in this context. Free will allows for evil but results in the greater good of people being responsible moral agents. Natural evil can also be explained as allowing for the greater good of moral development. Paul essentially makes a greater good theodicy statement when he writes, “And we know that God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose” (Rom 8:28).
A compelling version of greater good theodicy is called organic unities. The basic principle is that the value of a whole is not determined by the sum of the value of its parts. Therefore, it is possible for an organic unity to be good while having evil parts that are necessary. Graham Floyd writes, “Organic unities are wholes (objects or states of affairs) that have good, bad, or indifferent valued parts. These parts contribute to the existence of the whole but do not determine the value of the whole … therefore, an organic whole may have bad or indifferent parts but still possess the power of goodness.” [x] An example of a possible organic unity is farming, where plants must be killed in order for food to be produced.
Simple organic unities can be used as parts to form compound organic unities. Combinations of simple and compound organic unities can then form higher order organic unities. In this way, each individual organic unity does not necessarily have to be good if it is part of a higher order organic utility that is good. This hierarchy of organic unities ends with the whole of all reality, which includes both physical reality and spiritual reality. This hierarchical structure of organic unities is shown in the figure below.
Floyd makes a compelling argument that organic unities prevent atheists from arguing that God cannot exist from both the logical and evidential formulations of the problem of evil. This is because to do so, the atheist must assume what he is trying to prove:
“In order to justify his atheism, the atheist must appeal to the existence of gratuitous and pointless evil. The only gratuitous and pointless evil possible given the argument from organic unities is the highest-level organic unity, and the atheist’s understanding of the highest-level organic unity already implies the truth of atheism. The argument is circular and unusable.”[xi]
Atheists might disagree, but this type of argument will probably be effective in addressing the problem of evil with anyone other than atheist philosophy professors. A good apologetic approach is to begin with free will theodicy, which is easy to understand. Soul building theodicy can be used if the problem of natural evil arises. For those still skeptical, the complexities of greater good theodicy and organic unities may be required.
[i] J. L. Mackie, “Evil and Omnipotence,” Mind: New Series, Vol. 64, no. 254, April 1955: 200-212.
[ii] The following article gives a good overview of the evidential formulation of the problem of evil: Ian Church, Isaac Warchol, and Justin Barrett, “The Context of Suffering: Empirical Insights into the Problem of Evil,” TheoLogica, Vol. 6, no. 1, 2022.
[iii] William Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly, vol. 16, 1979.
[iv] Westminster Confession of Faith, 1646: Ch.3, ¶¶1-2.
[v] Jordan Steffaniak, “Ruled Knowing and the Problem of Evil: Is Free Will Theism Necessary?” The Reformed Theological Review, vol. 77 no. 3, Dec. 2018: 170.
[vi] Douglas Groothuis, Christian Apologetics: A Comprehensive Case for Biblical Faith, 2nd ed., Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2022: 689.
[vii] C.S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, New York, NY: HarperOne, 1952/2002: 47-48.
[viii] C.S. Lewis, The Problem of Pain, Québec: Samizdat University Press, 1940/2016: 60.
[ix] Erik Wielenberg, “In Defense of C.S. Lewis’ Soul-Making Theodicy: A Reply to Wolterstorff,” Journal of Inklings Studies, Oct. 2019: 198.
[x] Graham Floyd, “Organic Unities: A Response to the Problem of Evil,” TheoLogica, vol. 3, no, 2, 2019: 123.
[xi] Ibid., 137.
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