Discussion 33: Thomas Aquinas on the Trinity

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QUESTION: The Father of the Trinity is the father of the Son, begets the son, and spirates the Holy Spirit. Are these three separate things, or in some sense the same thing?

THOMAS AQUINAS (c.1225–1274). Thomas was from the Italian town of Aquino and is typically referred to as Thomas Aquinas. He was a Dominican friar, priest, theologian, and philosopher. Thomas’s primary theological approach was to take the philosophical framework of Aristotle and apply it to theology. This is referred to as Thomistic philosophy, Thomistic theology, or simply Thomism. His best-known works are the Summa Theologica, Summa contra Gentiles, and his commentary on Peter Abelard’s Sentences. Our readings are taken from Summa Theologica.

DEFINITIONS. In order to make these readings more comprehensible, some medieval theological terms will first be defined. Divine simplicity means that God is not made up of parts. Relation means a property of something, not a relationship between things. Divine relations are therefore paternity (a relation of the Father), filiation (a relation of the Son), procession (a relation of the Holy Spirit), and spiration (a relation of both the Father and the Son). A notion is an ideas by which divine persons are knows and include the four divine relations plus the unbegottenness of the Father. Notional acts are intratrinitarian activities associated with notions: the active generation of the Father, the passive generation of the Son (also called nativity), the active spiration of both the Father and the Son, and the passive spiration of the Holy Spirit (also called procession).

READING 1. Whether relation is the same as person? […] Person and property are really the same, but differ in concept. […] We must, however, consider that in God, by reason of the divine simplicity, a twofold real identity exists as regards what in creatures are distinct. For, since the divine simplicity excludes the composition of matter and form, it follows that in God the abstract is the same as the concrete, as “Godhead” and “God.” And as the divine simplicity excludes the composition of subject and accident, it follows that whatever is attributed to God, is His essence Itself; and so, wisdom and power are the same in God, because they are both in the divine essence. According to this twofold identity, property in God is the same person. For personal properties are the same as the persons because the abstract and the concrete are the same in God; since they are the subsisting persons themselves, as paternity is the Father Himself, and filiation is the Son, and procession is the Holy Ghost. [Summa Theologica, 1q40.1]

READING 2. Whether the persons are distinguished by the relations? In whatever multitude of things is to be found something common to all, it is necessary to seek out the principle of distinction. So, as the three persons agree in the unity of essence, we must seek to know the principle of distinction whereby they are several. Now, there are two principles of difference between the divine persons, and these are “origin” and “relation.” Although these do not really differ, yet they differ in the mode of signification; for “origin” is signified by way of act, as “generation;” and “relation” by way of the form, as “paternity.” […] But it is against the nature of origin that it should constitute hypostasis or Person. […] It is therefore better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although in both ways they are distinguished, nevertheless in our mode of understanding they are distinguished chiefly and firstly by relations. [Summa Theologica, 1q40.2]

READING 3. Whether the properties presuppose the notional acts? […] we must absolutely say that the relations in our mode of understanding follow upon the notional acts, so that we can say, without qualifying the phrase, that “because He begets, He is the Father.” A distinction, however, is needed if we suppose that the relations distinguish and constitute the divine hypostases. For origin has in God an active and passive signification– active, as generation is attributed to the Father, and spiration, taken for the notional act, is attributed to the Father and the Son; passive, as nativity is attributed to the Son, and procession to the Holy Ghost. For, in the order of intelligence, origin, in the passive sense, simply precedes the personal properties of the person proceeding; because origin, as passively understood, signifies the way to a person constituted by the property. Likewise, origin signified actively is prior in the order of intelligence to the non-personal relation of the person originating; as the notional act of spiration precedes, in the order of intelligence, the unnamed relative property common to the Father and the Son. The personal property of the Father can be considered in a twofold sense: firstly, as a relation; and thus again in the order of intelligence it presupposes the notional act, for relation, as such, is founded upon an act: secondly, according as it constitutes the person; and thus the notional act presupposes the relation, as an action presupposes a person acting. [Summa Theologica, 1q40.4]

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